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OFF WITH HIS HEAD: THE KING CAN DO NO
WRONG, HURRICANE KATRINA, AND THE
MISSISSIPPI RIVER GULF OUTLET
∗

Christopher R. Dyess

“[I]f a team of top-flight engineers had been assigned to build an
instrument for the quick and effective flooding of New Orleans; they
could not have come up with a better design than the [Mississippi River
Gulf Outlet].” – Douglas Brinkley1
ABSTRACT
Congress passed the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1946 to provide a legal remedy
to citizens for torts committed by the Federal Government. Prior to the act,
United States citizens were mostly prohibited from filing suits against the
government for torts committed by government employees. However, Congress
when passing the act realized that some government actions are the result of
considered policy judgment for what is in the best interest of the citizenry as a
whole. In order to prevent the government from being sued for such actions,
Congress included what is referred to as the Discretionary Function Exception. If
a government employee’s action falls within the parameters of the Discretionary
Function Exception the government is immune from tort liability. This Article
argues that courts have interpreted the Discretionary Function too broadly such
that it now excuses the government from egregious unjustifiable harms to the
American public.
The Article explores this topic using a recent example in which the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals, in a confused opinion, denied relief to victims of
Hurricane Katrina. Even though the Army Corps of Engineers—who is
∗

J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2014; I would like to thank foremost my wife
Jessica Oulton for her unwavering support of all my endeavors. I would also like to thank the
Journal of Law and Social Policy editors for their hard work. Finally, I would like to thank
Professor Marshall S. Shapo for teaching his students how, rather than what, to think about tort
law.
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DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, THE GREAT DELUGE: HURRICANE KATRINA, NEW ORLEANS, AND THE
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responsible for a navigational canal found to be the cause of multiple levee
breaches—admitted wrongdoing, the Fifth Circuit used the broad application of
the Discretionary Function Exception to deny liability for the government. After
reviewing the jurisprudential history of the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Article
argues that a doctrinal application of the Discretionary Function Exception
should find that the government is not immune from liability. Finally, the Article
reviews the purposes and policy justifications for tort law and concludes that the
only just result in the Hurricane Katrina case is a finding of liability.
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INTRODUCTION
Hurricane Katrina ravaged the Gulf Coast of the United States when it made
landfall on August 29, 2005. The storm killed 1,836 people, cost an estimated
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$110 billion, and destroyed or otherwise made uninhabitable 275,000 homes. 2
Many people who were following the events initially believed that the damage
caused by the storm was solely the result of Katrina’s unprecedented power.3 In
the months and years that followed, however, it became clear that this was a
manmade disaster created by a levee system that was improperly built and
maintained. 4 The citizens of New Orleans quickly identified the United States
Army Corps of Engineers (“Army Corps” or “Corps”), the federal agency charged
with maintaining and operating the levee system that protects New Orleans, as the
culprit.5
Shortly thereafter, New Orleanians began displaying the slogan “Hold the
Corps Accountable” on t-shirts and yard signs.6 Citizens openly blamed the Army
Corps in conversations about the storm. 7 Many believed that the Army Corps
should be held liable for much of the damage caused by the failure of the levees.8
Those who felt this way were quickly disappointed to learn that, traditionally,
governments have escaped liability to their own citizens through the long-held
doctrine of sovereign immunity.
For nearly two centuries, American citizens were de facto precluded from
suing the federal government for traditional torts.9 This changed in the middle of
the twentieth century when Congress passed the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA).10 Prior to the passage of the FTCA, the federal courts were not involved

2

Taraka Anada, Comment, The Perfect Storm, An Imperfect Response, and A Sovereign Shield:
Can Hurricane Katrina Victims Bring Negligence Claims Against the Government?, 35 PEPP. L.
REV. 279, 281-383 (2008).
3
See Joseph B. Treaster and Kate Zernike, Hurricane Slams into Gulf Coast; Dozens are Dead,
N.Y. TIMES, August 30, 2005, at A1 (largely blaming the damage and death caused by the storm in
New Orleans on the hurricane’s 100 mile per hour winds and 15 foot storm surge).
4
See John Schwartz, Engineers Faulted on Hurricane System, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2007, at A13
(reporting that the levee system originally designed was very different from the one the Corps
ultimately built); see also John Schwartz, Army Builders Accept Blame Over Flooding, N.Y.
TIMES, June 2, 2006, at A1.
5
See id.
6
See Michael Abromowitv & Peter Whoriskey, New Orleans Honors Its Dead, WASH. POST, Aug.
30, 2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/08/29/AR2006082900515.html.
7
See e.g. David Corn, Harry Shear v. the Army Corps of Engineers, MOTHER JONES, Aug. 28,
2010, available at http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2010/08/harry-shearer-army-corpsengineers-hurricane-katrina-documentary (discussing a documentary by a New Orleans citizen
that openly blames the Army Corps for levee failures in the city).
8
See Leslie Eaton, New Orleans Files Claim Against Corps for Billions, N.Y. TIMES, May 3,
2007, at A12 (reporting that the city and thousands of residents were seeking compensation from
the Army Corps of Engineers for losses due to Hurricane Katrina).
9
See infra subpart I(A), at 5-8.
10
See Pub. L. No. 79-753, 60 Stat. 812 (1946).
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in tort claims against the federal government.11 If the federal government harmed
one of its own citizens, the only remedy was to petition Congress to pass a bill
providing relief.12 After the passage of the FTCA, citizens were permitted to sue
the federal government in a federal court in tort.13
Theoretically, under the FTCA, the citizens of New Orleans could sue the
federal government for negligent construction and maintenance of levees that
failed during Hurricane Katrina. In the case of flooding in New Orleans, it was
more complicated because the Flood Control Act of 1928 (FCA) specifically
indemnified the federal government for flooding damage related to the
construction of levees.14 Specifically § 702(c) of the FCA was enacted in response
to massive flooding that occurred along the Mississippi River in 1927.15 The flood
caused more than $200 million in property damage (approximately $2.6 billion in
2012 dollars adjusted for inflation), accounted for nearly 200 deaths, and left
700,000 people homeless. 16 To prevent a similar level of devastation from
happening in the future, the federal government implemented a massive flood
control initiative. 17 Congress included the construction of a levee system to
protect the City of New Orleans in the flood control measures.18
This massive undertaking by the federal government created fear among
some members of Congress. Legislators saw the potential for a surge of litigation
against the United States in the event that another flood overwhelmed the
government-maintained system. 19 Representative Bertrand Snell of New York
stated, “I for one do not want to open up a situation that will cause thousands of
lawsuits for damages against the Federal Government [sic] for the next 10, 20, or
50 years.”20
In order to indemnify the government from lawsuits, thereby allowing the
government to get into the business of flood control, Congress included § 702(c)
in the FCA. This section provides that “[n]o liability of any kind shall attach to or
rest upon the United States for any damage from or by floods or flood waters in
11

See infra subpart I(A), at 5-8.
See Id.
13
See Pub. L. No. 79-753, 60 Stat. 812 (1946).
14
33 U.S.C.A. § 702c (West)
15
Kent C. Hofman, An Enduring Anachronism: Arguments for the Repeal of the § 702(c)
Immunity Provision of the Flood Control Act of 1928, 79 TEX. L. REV. 791, 793 (2001); see S.
REP. NO. 70-619, at 12 (1928) (discussing the devastation caused by the flood).
16
See S. REP. NO. 70-619, at 12 (1928).
17
See Hofman, supra note 15, at 793.
18
See David M. Stein, Flood of Litigation: Theories of Liability of Government Entities for
Damages Resulting from Levee Breaches, 52 LOY. L. REV. 1341, 1338-39 (2006) (discussing that
the New Orleans levee system was included in the Flood Control Act).
19
See 69 CONG. REC. 6640 (1928).
20
Id.
12
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any place,”21 so long as the breached levee was constructed in relation to floodcontrol activity. As a result of this legislation, the citizens of New Orleans were
unable to sue the federal government for the negligent operation of the levee
system, which was constructed to control flooding in the city.22
With § 702(c) precluding suits based on failed levees built around the city,
the citizens of New Orleans could not sue for negligent design of the levee
system, regardless of the FTCA. The only option for the citizens of New Orleans
was a suit under the FTCA for levee failures built along the Mississippi River
Gulf Outlet (MRGO). MRGO is a navigational canal constructed by the Army
Corps to create a shortcut from the Gulf of Mexico—through miles of marsh—to
the Port of New Orleans.23 As Hurricane Katrina came ashore, the channel acted
as a funnel directing Katrina’s storm surge into the levee system and ultimately
causing multiple breaches. 24 Since MRGO is a navigational channel—not
constructed for the purpose of flood-control activity—the FCA does not apply.25
Without the shield of § 702(c) of the FCA, citizens of New Orleans who suffered
property damage due to levee failures caused by water surging through MRGO
should have been free to sue the Army Corps.26 Any successful suit, however,
would have to be based on the government’s waiver of sovereign immunity and
the broad exceptions granted the government under the FTCA.27
This Comment will analyze the FTCA and its purposes in relation to recent
litigation concerning the operation and maintenance of MRGO. Part I will provide
background information on sovereign immunity within the US, the FTCA, and the
Discretionary Function Exception (DFE). Part II will review and critique the
recent decision in In Re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation,28 where the court
held that the government was shielded from liability for negligent maintenance of
MRGO. Part III will analyze the Army Corps’ actions in the context of traditional
tort law doctrine and will suggest that the Army Corps should be held liable. Part
IV will conclude that federal courts have broadened the DFE such that it no
longer achieves the original intent of Congress.

21

33 U.S.C. § 702(c) (2012).
In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 647 F.Supp.2d 644, 699 (E.D.La. 2009).
23
History of MRGO, UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS NEW ORLEANS DIVISION,
http://mrgo.gov/MRGO_History.aspx (last visited January 23, 2013).
24
See Joby Warrick & Michael Grunwald, Investigators Link Levee Failures to Design Flaws,
WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2005, at A1.
25
In re Katrina Canal Breaches, 647 F.Supp.2d at 699.
26
See id. at 699.
27
Id. at 699-701.
28
In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 696 F.3d 436 (5th Cir. 2012).

22
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SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY, THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT AND THE
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION
A. The History of Sovereign Immunity in the United States

The concept of sovereign immunity derives from the common law maxim
“the King can do no wrong.”29 The essential notion is that it is a contradiction of
the King’s sovereignty to allow him to be sued in his own courts.30 In the context
of a monarchy, this makes sense because the King is all-powerful and his subjects
must bend to his will. However, in our constitutional democracy, the power of the
sovereign is derived directly from the people, and the judicial limitation on suits
against the federal government creates tension between two elements of
constitutionalism: government accountability and the need to shield the
government from limitless tort litigation. 31 As Professor Vicki Jackson has
written:
On the one hand, constitutionalism entails a commitment that
government should be limited by law and accountable . . . for the
protection of fundamental rights; if the “essence of civil liberty” is
that the law provide remedies for violations of rights, immunizing
government from ordinary remedies is in considerable tension with
all but the most formalist understandings of law and rights.32
How this monarchist doctrine survived in our representative democracy
remains rather obscure.33 But, there is no doubt that sovereign immunity remains
a part of American jurisprudential theory. As Justice Holmes said, “there can be
no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends.”34 Initially, sovereign immunity was expressed as a denial of a right to
sue.35 However, the mere denial of a right evolved into a substantive immunity
when the Supreme Court held that the federal government was immune from all
liability in tort.36

29

VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, KATHRYN KELLY & DAVID F. PARTLETT, PROSSER, WADE AND
SCHWARTZ’S TORTS 638-39 (10th ed. 2000).
30
Id.
31
See Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty, Immunity, and Judicial
Independence, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 521, 521 (2003).
32
Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1809)).
33
SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 29, at 638.
34
Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
35
Gibbons v. United States, 75 U.S. 269; see SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 29, at 638.
36
See SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 29, at 638.
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It remains a matter of scholarly debate whether or not the Founding Fathers
accepted sovereign immunity at the time of the drafting of the U.S. Constitution.37
Nevertheless, it has been accepted by the Supreme Court that “[w]hen the
Constitution was ratified, it was well established in English law that the crown
could not be sued without consent in its courts.” 38 This understanding of
American legal history is supported by the historical record, which shows that
many esteemed Founders endorsed the concept of sovereign immunity.
In Federalist No. 81, Alexander Hamilton wrote, “[i]t is inherent in the
nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its
consent.”39 The first Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, John Marshall, calmed
the fears of the Virginia Delegation during ratification by saying “[i]t is not
rational to suppose that the sovereign power should be dragged before a court.”40
Arguably, recognition of sovereign immunity, at least at the state level, was
essential to the ratification of the Constitution.
Prior to the enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1946, which
waived the Government’s immunity for certain tort actions, it was “a well settled
rule of law that the government [was] not liable for the nonfeasances or
misfeasances or negligence of its officers, and that the only remedy to the injured
party in such cases is by appeal to Congress.” 41 The injured party’s appeal to
Congress for a redress of grievances meant requesting that a private bill be
enacted providing relief from the government’s harmful action. Since appealing to
Congress was the only method of seeking justice, Congress was quickly inundated
with requests. 42 As a result, Congress became an adjudicator for a variety of
claims filed against the United States.43
John Quincy Adams, as a member of Congress, complained about the
private bill process, writing, “[i]t is judicial business, and legislative assemblies
ought to have nothing to do with it. One–half of the time of Congress is consumed

37

Gregory C. Sisk, A Primer on the Doctrine of Federal Sovereign Immunity, 58 OKLA. L. REV.
439, 443 (2005).
38
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999).
39
THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (emphasis in
original).
40
3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 555 (photo. reprint 1941) (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., Lenox Hill Pub. & Dist. Co.
1974) (1836).
41
German Bank v. United States, 148 U.S. 573, 579 (1893).
42
William G. Weaver & Thomas Longoria, Bureaucracy that Kills: Federal Sovereign Immunity
and the Discretionary Function Exception, 96 AM. POLITICAL SCI. REV. 335, 340 (2002) (noting
that an 1848 House report on private bills in the previous decade showed 16,573 private bills
introduced).
43
See Id. at 340-41.
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by it, and there is no common rule of justice for any two of the cases decided.”44
In response, the legislature created the Court of Claims in 1855, which provided a
judicial forum in Congress for some claims against the United States.45 However,
members of Congress shared the view of John Quincy Adams and objected to
their involvement with private claims.46
By the twentieth century, the process for dealing with private claims was
well established but tedious and inefficient.47 Congress was not able to effectively
decide tort claims on their merits.48 Service on the Committee of Claims, which
was responsible for determining government liability, was considered arduous
because careful consideration could not be given to the thousands of claims
submitted to Congress.49 For decades, Congress debated various proposals for a
general tort claims act that would remove the burden of contending with private
bills.50
B. The Federal Tort Claims Act
The private bill system was eliminated in 1946 when Congress passed the
FTCA as Title IV of the Legislative Reorganization Act.51 The FTCA’s grant of
jurisdiction states that
[T]he district courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil
actions on claims against the United States, for money damages,
accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of
property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or
wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government
while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would

44
8 JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, COMPRISING PORTIONS OF HIS
DIARY FROM 1795 TO 1848 480 (Charles Francis Adams, ed., J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1874).
45

See Weaver & Longoria, supra note 42, at 340-41.
PAUL FIGLEY, A GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT 6 (2012).
47
See Weaver & Longoria, supra note 42, at 340-41.
48
See James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills: Indemnification
and Government Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1862, 1888-92 (2010);
see also Adams, supra note 44, at 480.
49
See Tort Claims: Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463 Bills to Provide for the Adjustment of
Certain Torts Claims Against the United States Before H. Comm. on the Judiciary 77th Cong., 2d
Sess. 49-55 (1942) (“Criticisms by Congressmen of Existing Procedure of Relief by Private Claim
Bills”).
50
FIGLEY, supra note 46, at 7.
51
Pub. L. No. 79-753, 60 Stat. 812 (1946).

46
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be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place
where the act or omission occurred.52
This waiver of the long-held doctrine of sovereign immunity appears on its
face to be astounding. The FTCA not only waived sovereign immunity, but also
subjected the federal government to the common law of torts in the state where
the alleged wrong occured as long as the redress sought was monetary.
However, the waiver of sovereign immunity provided by the FTCA was not
limitless. Congress provided for several statutory exceptions that preclude the
liability of the federal government in tort. Examples of these exceptions include
“[a]ny claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military . . . during time
of war,” 53 “[a]ny claim for damages caused by the fiscal operations of the
Treasury or by the regulation of the monetary system,”54 and “[a]ny claim for
damages caused by the imposition or establishment of a quarantine by the United
States.”55 These exceptions are very specific and were designed to prevent the
federal government from being sued while performing essential governmental
duties.
The broadest exception is referred to as the Discretionary Function
Exception and it shields the federal government from
[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the
Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or
regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or
based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal
agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the
discretion involved be abused.56
These exceptions function to reassert sovereign immunity when a court
determines that the harmful act at issue falls within the exception’s scope. The
result is the immediate dismissal of the claim.57 The exceptions protect not only
the United States from suit, but also individual governmental actors.58 Once the

52

28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1)(2006).
Id. § 2680(j).
54
Id. § 2680(i).
55
Id. § 2680(f).
56
Id. § 2680(a).
57
Jonathan R. Bruno, Note, Immunity for “Discretionary” Functions: A Proposal to Amend the
Federal Tort Claims Act, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 411, 421 (2012).
58
See, e.g., Robert D. Lee, Jr., Federal Employees, Torts, and the Westfall Act of 1988, 56 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 334 (1996).
53
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suit has been dismissed, the party’s only option is to seek redress directly from
Congress, making them no better off than they were prior to the FTCA.59
1. Interpreting the Scope of the Discretionary Function Exception – Dalehite v.
United States
In the years following the enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act, the
Court left open the question of what conduct fell within the scope of the DFE.60
The FTCA provided a broad waiver of immunity with exceptions in very specific
circumstances. 61 It appeared initially that the Supreme Court would take a
conservative approach to the DFE, believing that courts should not expand the
exceptions through statutory construction.62 The Supreme Court therefore would
permit claims brought against the federal government as long as the exceptions in
the statute did not preclude them.63
Dalehite v. United States64 was the first in a series of cases that contributed
to modern DFE jurisprudence. The litigation in Dalehite was brought about by the
Texas City disaster in 1947. As a result of famine after World War II, the United
States Government began the production and distribution of explosive-grade
fertilizer to Europe.65 While sitting in port waiting to be shipped to Europe, three
thousand tons of fertilizer exploded injuring three thousand people, killing at least
581, and destroying the harbor.66 The district court found for the plaintiffs on the
theory that the government was negligent “in drafting and adopting the fertilizer
export plan as a whole,” in failing to properly supervise the loading of the
fertilizer, and for negligent manufacture.67 After the appellate court reversed, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to consider the scope of the DFE.68
Justice Reed’s opinion upheld the appellate court’s ruling that the DFE
precluded the government from liability. He began by turning to the legislative
history to assess Congressional intent in drafting the FTCA.69 Justice Reed stated
that the DFE’s purpose was to ensure that the bill protected “the Government
against tort liability for errors in the administration or in the exercise of
59

See Id.
See Lawrence Kaminski, Comment, Torts – Application of Discretionary Function Exception of
Federal Tort Claims Act, 36 MARQ. L. REV. 88, 88 (discussing the puzzlement over scope of the
Discretionary Function Exception).
61
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2680(a), (f), (i), (j) (2006).
62
United States v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366, 370 (1949).
63
Id.
64
Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
65
Id. at 19-20.
66
Bruno, supra note 57, at 424.
67
Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 23.
68
See id. at 17.
69
See id. at 24-30.
60
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discretionary functions.” 70 He then stated, “it was not contemplated that the
Government should be subject to liability arising from acts of a governmental
nature or function.” 71 Providing his own definition for how broadly the DFE
should be applied, he said that it
includes more than the initiation of programs and activities. It also
includes determinations made by executives and administrators in
establishing plans, specifications or schedules of operation. Where
there is room for policy judgment and decision there is discretion.
It necessarily follows that acts of subordinates in carrying out the
operations of government in accordance with official directions
cannot be actionable.72
In his view, the DFE was very broad and covered not only high-level
planning, but also the implementation of those plans by low-level bureaucrats.
Justice Jackson wrote a sharp dissent, arguing that this manmade disaster
was “caused by forces set in motion by the government, [and] completely
controlled or controllable by it.” 73 He started by pointing out that the civil
damages action was “one of the law’s most effective inducements to the
watchfulness and prudence necessary to avoid calamity from hazardous
operations in the midst of an unshielded populace.” 74 In his view, a broad
interpretation of the DFE would allow the government to “clothe official
carelessness [in] a public interest.”75
One consideration for Justice Jackson was that because the government
knew that the fertilizer was explosive, there was a duty to protect the public.76
Arguing essentially that the government was in a better position to prevent the
injury than the general public was, he said, “[w]here experiment or research is
necessary to determine the presence or degree of danger, the product must not be
tried out on the public, nor must the public be expected to possess the facilities or
technical knowledge to learn for itself of . . . dangers.” 77 Justice Jackson was
concerned that precluding the government from liability would not appropriately
discourage risky behavior.78

70

Id. at 26-27.
Id. at 28.
72
Id. at 35-36.
73
Id. at 48.
74
Id. at 49.
75
Id. at 50.
76
See id. at 52.
77
Id.
78
See id.
71
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Justice Jackson then clarified his position by arguing that the DFE was
meant to apply to governmental officials and agencies when they are performing
work that is governmental in nature.79 His example was that of an attorney general
who could not be held liable for false arrest even when a private person would.80
However, government officials frequently “deal only with the housekeeping side
of federal activities.”81 In these cases, he said, “there is no good reason to stretch
the legislative text to immunize the Government or its officers from responsibility
for their acts if done without appropriate care for the safety of others.” 82 He
concluded by saying that if the DFE is to be read as broadly as the majority had
read it, then “the ancient and discredited doctrine that ‘The King can do no
wrong’ has not been uprooted; it has been merely amended to read, ‘The King can
do only little wrongs.’”83
It would be another three decades before the Supreme Court ruled on the
DFE again.84 In the meantime, the lower federal courts struggled to adjudicate the
DFE, because the scope was unclear.85
The Supreme Court provided some clarity in Berkovitz v. United States.86 In
Berkovitz, Justice Marshall offered a two-prong test for judges interpreting the
DFE. First, the judge must determine whether “the action is a matter of choice for
the [Government] employee.”87 This step is required because the language of the
exception states that the Government’s conduct must involve discretion.88 If the
authorizing source for the government mandates a particular course of action, then
there is no discretion to act otherwise.89 Therefore, a finding that the government
failed to perform a mandated activity leaves the challenged act outside the scope
of the DFE and the suit against the government can proceed.
However, after the court finds under the first prong that the government did
have discretion in choosing a course of action, the court must analyze the second
prong of the test.90 In this case, the judge must determine “whether the allegedly
tortious decision was ‘based on considerations of public policy’” 91 or
79

See id. at 59.
Id.
81
Id. at 60.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531 (1988).
85
See Harold J. Krent, Preserving Discretion without Sacrificing Deterrence: Federal Liability in
Tort, 38 UCLA L. REV. 871, 880 (1991).
86
Berkovitz, 486 U.S. 531.
87
Id. at 536.
88
28 U.S.C. § 2680 (2006) (DFE immunity applies to “any claim . . . based upon the exercise or
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“incorporates considerable ‘policy judgment.’”92 If the decision falls into either
category, then the DFE applies and the suit should be dismissed.93
One remaining question after Berkovitz was whether the government had to
show that the decision to take the challenged action was actually the result of
policy analysis. The Supreme Court clarified this point in United States vs.
Gaubert. 94 In Gaubert, the Court feared “a full-scale trial in every case that
involves the raising of the defense of [the DFE].” 95 The Court held that the
Government did not have to show actual policy analysis but rather could show
that the decision could have been the result of policy analysis. Justice White wrote
that “[t]he focus of the inquiry is not on the agent’s subjective intent in exercising
the discretion . . . but on the nature of the actions taken and on whether they are
susceptible to policy analysis.”96 It is within this framework of FTCA and DFE
interpretation that the citizens of New Orleans would have to operate in their
attempt to hold the Army Corps accountable for losses sustained due to the failure
of the levees.
II.

THE CITIZENS SPEAK: IN RE: KATRINA CANAL BREACHES LITIGATION

A. The Construction and Maintenance of the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet
In 1943, Congress requested a report from the Secretary of the Army on the
viability of building a shipping channel from the Gulf of Mexico to the Port of
New Orleans.97 Congress had two good reasons to request the report. First, the
Government realized during World War II that the Port of New Orleans,
Mississippi River, and the Gulf of Mexico played an important role in the
deployment of military supplies.98 For national security reasons, the Government
wanted to increase the efficiency of supply routes at the Port of New Orleans,
which were “overtaxed” during the war. 99 The second reason was purely
economical. By decreasing the distance from the port to the Gulf, the maritime
industry would save a significant amount of money.100
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Id. at 545.
Id. at 537 (“In sum, the [DFE] insulates the Government from liability if the action challenged
in the case involves the permissible exercise of policy judgment.”).
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United States vs. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315 (1991).
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Oral Argument at 21:12, United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315 (1991) (No. 89-1793),
available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1990/1990_89_1793.
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Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 324-25.
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H.R. Doc. No. 82-245 at 41 (1951).
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On September 25, 1951, the Chief of Engineers for the US Army sent the
completed report to the House of Representatives for review. 101 The report
recommended the construction of a deep draft channel on the east side of the
Mississippi River connecting New Orleans to the Gulf of Mexico.102 The Chief of
Engineers instructed that the channel was to be 36 feet deep and 500 feet wide
near the city, and would gradually expand to 38 feet deep and 600 feet wide near
the Gulf.103 It was stipulated that construction should be done “in accordance with
the plans of the division engineer and with such modifications . . . in the
discretion” of the Secretary of the Army acting through the Chief Engineer.104
The Army Corps knew, however, that the channel would need maintenance
because of the fragile geography of Southeastern Louisiana, created by wetlands
and swamp. One issue was the need for foreshore protection105 along the banks of
MRGO due to wave wash.106 On its way to New Orleans, MRGO cut through
“virgin coastal wetlands,”107 which were largely composed of “fat clay.” Fat clay
is fine gray clay that contains a lot of water, making it susceptible to lateral
displacement 108 and withering away. Without protection, the banks of MRGO
would gradually widen overtime. During Hurricane Katrina, the widened channel
created a “funnel effect” and intensified the velocity of each surge of water into
the New Orleans levee system. 109 Some estimates show that this increased the
initial storm surge into New Orleans by twenty percent.110
As early as 1958, the Army Corps recognized that this type of soil would
“displace laterally under fairly light load.”111 The Army Corps was also aware
that due to wave wash interacting with the fat clay, the channel would gradually
widen. The Army Corps wrote,
101

H.R. Doc. No. 82–245 at 1 (1951).
Id. at 2.
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Id. at 5.
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In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 647 F.Supp.2d 644, 653 (E.D. La. 2009).
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erosion due to wave wash in open areas can be expected . . . where
the peat and highly organic clays are exposed. Protection for this
area can be provided if and when the need for it becomes
necessary. No channel protection is included in the overall cost
estimate.112
Thus, the Army Corps was aware that eventually MRGO would require
additional protection to prevent wave wash from widening its banks. In addition,
without adequate protection, excavation, and dredging, the intrusion of saltwater
would cause erosion of the banks of MRGO.113 MRGO was completed in 1968,114
but foreshore protection was not added until 1986.115 By the time protection was
built for MRGO, it had grown to an average of 1,970 feet wide, nearly three times
its original design width.116
The expansion allowed by the Army Corps had three consequences. First,
the lateral displacement caused a reduction in the height of the levees along
MRGO that made them more susceptible to breaching.117 Judge Duvall likened
the reduction in levee height to the Greek myth of Sisyphus118 stating,
the channel was dug through soil that has a known propensity to
laterally displace . . . . The soil removed from the channel was
placed on the west bank of the MRGO placing weight or “loading”
the marsh. In turn, that action would cause [fat clay] to slough back
into the channel which would then require it to be dredged again,
creating a never ending cycle which significantly contributed to the
sinking of the MRGO Levee.119
As a result, by the time Hurricane Katrina came ashore, the levee along
MRGO had decreased to approximately 1.5 feet below its design target.120
The second consequence of the increased width of MRGO was berm
reduction.121 The increasing width of MRGO caused the berm to reduce from an
112

In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 647 F.Supp.2d at 699 (citing PX–0699 (MRGO
Design Memorandum 1–B (Revised 1959)).
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Id. at 666.
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Id. at 650.
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Id. at 665-66.
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Id. at 671.
117
Id. at 653-54.
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In Greek mythology, Sisyphus was a king who was punished by being forced to roll a boulder
up a hill, only to watch it roll back down, and repeat this process forever.
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In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 647 F.Supp.2d at 674.
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Id. at 673-74 (citing Trial Transcript, Bea at 1114-15).
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Berm Definition, OXFORD DICTIONARIES,
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average of 500 feet to approximately 200 to 300 feet. 122 The reduction in distance
of the berm made breaching more probable because it contributed to the reduction
in levee height.123
Finally, the increased width of MRGO caused a greater “fetch.”124 Fetch is
defined as “the width of open water that the wind blows over to affect the motion
of the water.”125 The wave height created by Katrina was a function of the depth
of the water and the impact of the winds on the fetch.126 The greater the fetch, the
more powerful the storm surge as a hurricane comes on shore. Since MRGO had
grown to nearly three times its design width, a significantly larger fetch was
created. As a result, the intensity of the wave strength that attacked the MRGO
levees was similarly increased, which made the levees more susceptible to
breaching.127
B. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated Litigation: The District Court
Finds the Government Liable Under the FTCA
The Plaintiffs in Katrina Canal Breaches filed negligence actions against
the United States of America and the United States Army Corps of Engineers
under the FTCA’s waiver of immunity. The heart of the complaint was that the
Army Corps of Engineers was liable for damage because MRGO was negligently
“designed, constructed, and maintained.” 128 According to the complaint, the
injury to the Plaintiff’s resulted from “one of the most predictable and preventable
catastrophes in American History.”129
In an opinion that spanned ninety-three pages of the Federal Reporter,
Judge Stanwood Duvall, a federal district court judge in the Eastern District of
Louisiana, began by recounting the history and maintenance of MRGO.130 Judge
Duvall then concluded that the Army Corps of Engineers’ negligence in
maintaining MRGO was a “substantial cause” of the breaching of certain levees

http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/berm (last visited Jun. 15,
2014).
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In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 647 F.Supp.2d at 674 (citing Trial Transcript, Bea
at 1159-60).
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Id. at 674-75.
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Id. at 675.
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Id.
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Id. at 674 (citing Trial Transcript, Morris at 175).
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Id. at 675 (citing Trial Transcript, Morris at 175).
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Complaint at 12, In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 647 F.Supp.2d 644 (E. D. La.
2009).
129
Id. at 1.
130
See supra subpart II(A); see also In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 647 F.Supp.2d.
at 648-51.
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during the storm.131 He went on to say, “[t]his court is utterly convinced that the
Corps’ failure to provide timely foreshore protection doomed [MRGO] to grow to
two to three times its design width.” 132 The increased width, he concluded,
destroyed banks that would have helped the levee withstand the hurricane and
added fetch that created a more forceful attack on the levee.133
Having found the Army Corps negligent, the next step was to address the
FCA and the exceptions to the FTCA. Judge Duvall quickly rejected the
Government’s contention that it was immune based on § 702(c) of the FCA.134
According to Judge Duvall, the failure to provide foreshore protection did not
concern flood control activity. 135 Highlighting the original “Design
Memorandum,” he noted that the Army Corps’ decisions were made in the
context of the MRGO project—construction of a shipping channel.136 Therefore, §
702(c) did not apply because none of the decisions involved flood-control
activity.137
The Government sought immunity from liability under the FTCA’s Due
Care Exception and the DFE.138 Like the DFE, the Due Care Exception is found
in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). 139 In order to show immunity under the Due Care
Exception, the Government was required to show that 1) the authorization to build
MRGO mandated a particular course of action, and 2) if there was a mandate,
show that due care was taken during execution.140 In applying this test, Judge
Duvall found that the Due Care Exception did not apply.141
In so finding, Judge Duvall distinguished design and construction of MRGO
from maintenance and operation. He wrote,
[A]s concerned the initial design and construction of MRGO, these
actions were shielded by the [DFE]. . . . [T]here was no violation
of any mandate . . . . However, with respect to the issue of the
maintenance and operation of the MRGO . . . [t]he Corps’ mandate
131

In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 647 F.Supp.2d at 697.
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Id. at 702.
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statute or regulation be valid”).
140
In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 647 F.Supp.2d at 701-02 (citing Welch v. United
States, 409 F.3d 646 (4th Cir. 2005)).
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Id. at 702 (“Due care was clearly absent in the Corps’ actions as to the maintenance and
operation of the MRGO. This exception is unavailable to the Corps.”).
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was to create, dredge and maintain a deep-draft channel [that] . . .
was to be 36 feet deep and 500 feet wide, increasing . . . to 38 feet
deep and 600 feet wide. Nothing was presented at trial that . . .
with this mandate, the Corps was also given the latitude to allow
the channel to multiply in width . . . . This grant did not and could
not have given the Corps the ability to ignore the unbridled growth
of [MRGO].142
The finding of a mandate to maintain MRGO at its design parameters
makes logical sense. It would be an odd result to hold that Congress would
authorize the building of a sixty-six mile channel at certain dimensions, but not
require the maintenance of that channel at those same dimensions. Thus, Judge
Duvall concluded that there was a mandate for the Army Corps to maintain
MRGO at its design dimensions and “[d]ue care was clearly absent,”143 so the
Due Care Exception was not available to the Government.
The finding of a mandate to maintain and operate MRGO within its original
design functions should have been dispositive to the question of whether the DFE
applied. As Judge Duvall correctly stated, the Supreme Court in Gaubert
established a two-part test to determine whether the DFE applies. 144 The first
inquiry requires that the challenged act must involve an element of judgment.145 If
a statute, regulation, or policy prescribes a course of action (i.e. contains a
mandate) then the employees acting on behalf of the government have no choice
but to adhere to it. 146 If Judge Duvall found while analyzing the Due Care
Exception that the “Corps’ mandate was to create, dredge, and maintain a deepdraft channel [that] . . . was to be 36 feet deep and 500 feet wide, increasing . . . to
38 feet deep and 600 feet wide,”147 then the government had no choice but to
ensure that the channel did not widen. Eliminating the first prong of the Gaubert
test, Judge Duvall should have ruled that the DFE did not apply.148
One possible response is that Judge Duvall was only referring to a mandate
to construct MRGO within those dimensions. However, Judge Duvall explicitly
states that there is a difference between the construction and design (for which he
found no mandate to build foreshore protection) and maintenance and
142
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operation.149 The mandate to maintain MRGO necessarily must include keeping it
within reasonable dimensions. It would be hard to imagine a mandate to maintain
a navigational channel that allowed the channel to nearly triple in width. The
failure of the Army Corps to adhere to this mandate causes the government’s use
of the DFE to collapse.
Another possible rejoinder is that there was no mandate concerning how the
Army Corps was to ensure that MRGO’s expansion be controlled. Therefore, the
Army Corps had some discretion in maintaining MRGO. This argument,
however, puts the cart before the horse. If the Army Corps had a mandate to
maintain the channel at a certain width, it does not matter how it was to be
accomplished. It only matters that the channel width be maintained. Once it has
been determined that there was a mandate to maintain MRGO’s dimensions, the
Army Corps “ha[d] no rightful option but to adhere to the directive.”150
Judge Duvall’s analysis of the first prong of the DFE did not recognize his
previous conclusion that the Army Corps had a mandate to maintain MRGO
within its original design specifications. While Judge Duvall did not find for the
plaintiffs based on negligent maintenance, he did rule for the plaintiffs by
focusing on the Army Corps’ failure to prepare impact statements under the
National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA).151 NEPA requires all agencies of
the federal government to “include in every recommendation or report on
proposals for legislation and other Federal actions significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment, a detailed statement” on various impacts the
proposed action would have on the environment. 152 Because the Army Corps
failed to provide such reports, Judge Duvall ruled that the DFE was not available
to the Army Corps.153
Judge Duvall also ruled in the plaintiff’s favor under the second prong of
Gaubert ruling that the decision not to provide foreshore protection was not
policy based, but was the result of “[t]echnical, [e]ngineering, and [p]rofessional
[j]udgments.” 154 Here, Duvall essentially argued that the failure to provide
protection could not have been a policy decision because the Army Corps
admitted that it did not think MRGO created an additional hazard during a
hurricane. 155 Since they were unaware that MRGO would create a hazardous
condition during a hurricane, their failure to provide protection was based on an
erroneous scientific judgment, not on policy.156 Indeed, Judge Duvall referred to a
149
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lower court case to support the proposition that, “‘engineering judgment’ [is] not
a ‘matter of policy’ or an ‘exercise of policy judgment.’”157
In rejecting the government’s use of the DFE, Judge Duvall commented on
the broadness of the government’s position and of the DFE in general:
the Government’s position is . . . overly broad—that is that all [of
the Corps’] actions taken implicate[] the Government’s policy with
respect to maintenance of the MRGO. . . . In the event the Corps’
monumental negligence here would somehow be regarded as
“policy” then the exception would be an amorphous
incomprehensible defense without any discernable contours.158
Thus, Judge Duvall rejected the government’s use of the DFE because to
allow the government to use the DFE in this context would render the waiver of
sovereign immunity meaningless in the most important cases. As Justice Jackson
warned in Dalehite, an expansive application of the DFE does not waive
sovereign immunity in the most egregious case, but waives it only in the most
trivial.159
C. In re: Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated Litigation: The Appellate
Court’s Arbitrary Decisions and Faulty Reasoning
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit applied a de novo standard of review to the
district court’s finding.160 Initially, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
finding that the government negligently maintained MRGO by failing to provide
timely foreshore protection.161 However, in a rather bizarre turn of events several
months later, the Fifth Circuit reversed its initial finding. Unfortunately, it is
unclear why the Fifth Circuit made such a stark reversal. The revised opinion
relied on conclusory statements with little legal analysis.
Judge Jerry Smith’s affirming opinion, released on March 2, 2012,
addressed the three arguments analyzing the DFE. 162 First, he disagreed with
Judge Duvall’s analysis of the first prong of Berkovitz, arguing that NEPA was a
procedural statute that did not mandate particular results. 163 Under NEPA, the
government is allowed to undertake projects destructive to the environment as
long as the agency studies and disseminates information about the environmental
157
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consequences.164 The statute only mandates the process that must be taken.165 The
ultimate decision to act upon information provided by NEPA would have rested
with the Army Corps.166 Thus, Judge Smith found that “[a]t most the Corps ha[d]
abused its discretion [in deciding not to act on the information]—an abuse
explicitly immunized by the DFE.”167
On appeal, the plaintiffs directly addressed Judge Duvall’s finding that the
Army Corps violated a mandate to maintain MRGO within its design
specifications.168 Judge Smith’s analysis of the first prong of Berkovitz was thus
forced to deal with this issue. The government argued that because a previous
plan during the construction phase of MRGO anticipated some erosion, the Fifth
Circuit should find no maintenance mandate existed.169 The plaintiffs responded
by citing government documents identifying the authorized channel width as 500
feet and referencing Judge Duvall’s finding that Congress did not allow the
expansion of MRGO. 170 Judge Smith found for the United States in two
paragraphs with limited reasoning. He wrote that although MRGO nearly tripled
in size,
[t]he district court recognized . . . that the design for MRGO
expressly contemplated erosion from wave wash and did not
provide for armoring the banks. [Judge Duvall] held that these
design features were ‘shielded by the [DFE],’ a ruling . . . not
challeng[ed] on appeal. Logically, therefore the absence of
armoring . . . [could not] have violated a mandate sufficient to
negate the first Berkovitz prong.”171
At best, Judge Smith’s analysis shows that he did not understand the issue.
Judge Smith failed to recognize Judge Duvall’s explicit differentiation between
design and maintenance of MRGO. These two concepts are not the same; indeed,
they are mutually exclusive. Failing to provide for foreshore protection at the
design phase is not equivalent to the failure to maintain MRGO within its design
164
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specifications. The simple fact that Judge Duvall found that the DFE applied to
the design of MRGO does not “logically” require that it apply to the failure to
maintain the channel. In Judge Smith’s defense, the plaintiffs could have provided
a more forceful and affirmative argument on this point. A reading of the brief
leaves those who believe this argument to be the most powerful wanting.
Finally, Judge Smith addressed the argument raised by the plaintiffs that the
DFE does not shield the Government under the second prong of Berkovitz.
Addressing the question of whether or not the decision not to armor MRGO was
susceptible to policy analysis or “involves only the application of scientific
principles,”172 Judge Smith found the latter.173 Relying, in part, on a 1958 Army
Corps design memorandum, Judge Smith found that “the Corps labored under the
mistaken scientific belief that the MRGO would not increase storm surge
risks.”174 He then pointed to the United States’ own words at oral argument in the
district court to the same effect. There the United States argued that the Army
Corps “determined that MRGO played no role in major hurricane events . . . [and]
for that reason, the Corps saw no reason” to address armoring.175
Judge Smith continued in his criticism over the government’s position that
the decision was policy based saying it was “[a]gainst the considerable
evidence.”176 Pointing to a quote by the Government arguing that the Army Corps
failed to provide protection because they were protecting scarce resources, Judge
Smith said “[t]his . . . is the closest the government comes to arguing that it had
policy reasons—and not faulty scientific ones—for delaying MRGO’s
armoring.”177 He finished by saying, “[t]his is not a situation where the Corps
recognized a risk and chose not to mitigate it out of concern from some other
public policy []; it flatly failed to gauge the risk.”178 Accordingly, Judge Smith
held that the government’s claim to immunity under the DFE failed the second
prong of Berkovitz and immunity did not apply.179
This victory for the plaintiffs was short-lived. On September 24, 2012, six
months and twenty-two days after finding that the DFE did not immunize the
Government from suit, the Fifth Circuit abruptly withdrew the previous
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opinion. 180 Judge Smith’s opinion reversing the finding for the plaintiffs was
identical to the opinion that previously found the government liable except that
the seven paragraphs in the affirming opinion that convincingly argued that the
Army Corps’ decisions were not policy based were deleted. In their place, Judge
Smith added three paragraphs which started by stating “[a]s discussed above,
there is ample record evidence indicating the public-policy character of the Corps’
various decisions contributing to the delay in armoring [MRGO].”181
When read together with the March 2012 opinion affirming the district
court, the September 2012 opinion is confusing, unprincipled, and lacks reasoned
analysis. The most obvious source of puzzlement is trying to discern a principled
reason why the court made such a stark reversal. It is as though the final portion
of the opinion dealing with prong two of Berkovitz was written by a different
court.
The pendulum swung from “the Corps decisions were grounded on an
erroneous scientific judgment, not policy considerations” 182 to “[t]he Corps’
actual reasons for the delay are varied and sometimes unknown, but . . . the
decisions here were susceptible to policy considerations.”183 This recognition of
the Gaubert “susceptible to policy judgment” analysis is misguided. As the court
points out, “[i]f [the decision to not armor MRGO] is susceptible only to the
application of scientific principles . . . [the Government] is not immune [from
suit].”184 In the March opinion, the court made it perfectly clear that the failure to
armor MRGO was only based on scientific principles.185
In the first opinion, the court spent 7 paragraphs and 968 words (compared
to the same section in the new opinion that was 3 paragraphs and 354 words long
where the court rejected its court’s own reasoning in March) arguing that the
Government had not even shown it was aware that there was an issue regarding
foreshore protection.186 Indeed the court recognized that “plaintiffs can defeat the
presumption [of susceptibility to policy analysis] by showing, as a matter of fact,
that the government's actual decision was not a policy-based one.”187 In March,
the court was certain that the plaintiffs had done just that.188
180
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324

Vol. 9.2]

Christopher R. Dyess

Furthermore, the court stated that “although the Corps appears to have
appreciated the benefit of foreshore protection . . . it also had reason to consider
alternatives [for preventing channel widening].189 Thus, the court now believed
the decision was susceptible to policy analysis and was shielded by the DFE
under Gaubert.
This analysis is problematic for two reasons. First, as already noted,190 it
does not matter what measures the Army Corps decided or did not decide to
undertake to prevent the banks of MRGO from widening. What matters is that the
Army Corps violated its mandate to maintain the channel at its design
specifications. The court presented no analysis of how the Army Corps overcame
this initial hurdle.
Second, at oral argument, the Army Corps made it clear that they took no
steps to remediate the dangers posed by MRGO because they did not know any
dangers existed.191 If the decision to do nothing to prevent MRGO from widening
was susceptible to policy analysis, the implied policy analysis had nothing to do
with dangers posed by a hurricane. 192 Using this logic, the government would
rarely be found liable for a tort. Consider an obvious case of negligence such as
an automobile accident involving a government truck whose brakes failed due to
lack of routine maintenance. Based on the Fifth Circuit’s logic, the government
would only need to argue that checking the brakes and replacing them is
susceptible to policy analysis because the driver was free to consider other ways
of stopping the car. 193 This approach to the Gaubert policy analysis test is
astoundingly broad.
What is remarkable is that the court chose to simply delete its previous
reasoning rather than justify the revision with principled analysis and logic. There
was virtually no analysis provided in the updated opinion. The court simply
restated the Gaubert “susceptible to policy analysis” test and indicated that the
Army Corps’ actions passed this hurdle.194 Without any indication from the court

the channel would not cause increased water levels even though other scientific techniques found
otherwise) (citing the Government’s multiple admissions that the Corps believed MRGO would
play no significant role during a hurricane event) (noting that the Government produced no record
evidence that the Corps even considered budgets or other policy constraints in its failure to
provide foreshore protection).
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190
See supra subpart II(B).
191
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The court had already ruled out in the March opinion that the Corps actually had a policy
reason for not armoring MRGO. See id. at 394-95.
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as to why it chose to take such an unprincipled stand, one can only infer that the
court had its own policy reasons for reversing the decision.
III.

APPLYING RATIONALES FOR GOVERNMENT IMMUNITY UNDER THE
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION IN KATRINA CANAL BREACHES
A. Congressional Intent

The reasoning and logic in Katrina Canal Breaches raises a larger question:
why do the federal courts interpret the DFE to provide such a broad immunity
from suit for the United States even when negligence is shown? One reason they
have the latitude to do so is a function of the ambiguity of the statute itself.195 The
cost of the federal courts’ interpretation is a widening of the application of the
DFE from what Congress originally intended. 196 The legislative history shows
that Congress intended to prohibit the FTCA from being used to sue the
government where no negligence had been shown, and the only grounds to sue
was that the same conduct by a non-governmental actor would be actionable.197
Viewing the scope of the DFE with this lens, the purpose of the DFE was to
provide a procedural advantage,198 allowing the Government to dismiss cases on
the merits early on in the litigation if no negligence was shown.199 However, the
Congressional reports also show that the DFE was intended to shield the United
States from claims based on the “abuse of discretionary authority . . . whether or
not negligence is alleged to have been involved.”200 This language tends to lean in
the direction of a broader application of the DFE.
The scope of the DFE remains ambiguous and open to interpretation. It has
therefore been the charge of the federal courts to determine what activity is
“discretionary.” As the Katrina Canal Breaches case shows, courts continue to
struggle to define the exception’s scope and the results of the use of this immunity
are questionable.201
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See Bruno, supra note 57, at 431 (arguing that the text of the FTCA is ambiguous).
Id. at 431-432.
197
Id. (citing Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 29 n.21 (1953)).
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Id. at 432.
199
Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 281(b) (1965)).
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Id. at 432 (citing Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 29 n.21 (1953)).
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See Frigard v. U.S., 862 F.2d 201 (9th Cir. 1988) (Government immune under the DFE when
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private investors out of millions of dollars); Nevin v. U.S., 696 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir. 1983)
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B. Protecting the Public Purse

It has frequently been posited that the justification underlying most
decisions to deny liability under the DFE is protecting the treasury.202 In extreme
situations or in the aggregate, this logic makes sense. It would be difficult to
imagine a situation in which bankrupting the United States Treasury would be
justified in order to compensate the victim of a government tort. One cited
argument is that unlike many private actors, the Government “has the deepest
pockets of all.”203 This has the practical reality of ensuring that any successful tort
claims against the Government will be paid. 204 The Government coffers, it is
argued, are simply too tempting for lawyers seeking large fees and payouts and
thus access must be constrained.205
Empirical data on this subject, however, is simply not readily available.206
Professor Harold Krent has estimated that the DFE saves “perhaps billions of
dollars a year.” 207 This number, while certainly correct as a practical matter,
invites confusion. It is unknown whether Professor Krent is including all suits that
have been dismissed because of the DFE or if this includes only those suits that
may have been meritorious.208 Thus, the numbers provided by Professor Krent
can be misleading.
Furthermore, it is not entirely clear that simply because the DFE protects
the public purse it is therefore justified. One commentator has pointed out that it
would also be cost effective to withhold tax refunds due to taxpayers.209 However,
few would argue that the increased revenues to the public would justify such an
action. The question therefore is one that turns on social policy. Is it justifiable to
prevent government tort victims from receiving judgments because of fiscal
concerns? This Comment takes the position that courts should not provide blanket
immunity based on the liberal two-prong test in Berkovitz. Instead courts should
look to the facts of each case and determine whether the denial of redress is

exposure instead using them as “guinea pigs” in long-term studies of the effects of radiation
exposure).
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See Bruno, supra note 57, at 434-435; Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53
STAN. L. REV. 1201, 12-16-17 (2001).
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205
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See Bruno, supra note 57, at 434-435 (noting that arguments about the dollar amounts saved by
the Discretionary Function Exception can be misleading).
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James R. Levine, The Federal Tort Claims Act: A Proposal for Institutional Reform, 100 COL.
L. REV. 1538, 1550 (2000) (quoting Krent, supra note 85, at 871).
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See id. (stating that “Presumably Professor Kent includes massive areas of liability in which
claims are never brought because of counsel’s knowledge of the FTCA’s parameters.”).
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See Bruno, supra note 57, at 435.
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defensible given the circumstances. The current system approaches the problem
with the proverbial axe when a scalpel is needed.
Putting the actual dollar savings aside, this fear of fiscal annihilation may be
overblown because an application of traditional tort law doctrine would thwart
many tort claims against the government.210 There are many protections built into
the FTCA other than blanket immunity that provide more narrow procedural
mechanisms that limit liability for the government in frivolous cases. For
example, the FTCA bars trial by jury, instead requiring cases to be tried in front
of a federal judge.211 This blunts the fear that an emotional jury might side with
the plaintiffs more often than the government’s perceived cold bureaucracy.
Further protections come in the form of limiting the type of damages that
can be collected. The FTCA caps damages available as determined by laws of the
state where the action is brought. 212 In addition, punitive damages are
forbidden.213 Thus, there are numerous protections, other than the broad DFE, that
may serve to protect the government’s fiscal coffers.
The protection of the public treasury is not the only economic consideration
when analyzing the use of the DFE. Behavior modification is one of the chief
rationales for finding liability in tort. Along with the enforcement of criminal
laws, the threat of civil monetary liability is one of the chief means of controlling
behavior.214 With respect to shaping governmental conduct, the use of monetary
liability may be more effective.215 This is because organizations tend to act in
more predictable and rational ways than individuals. 216 When liability is an
available remedy, administrators in institutions are forced to consider tort liability
before taking action.217
Allowing liability against the government in tort is an equally plausible
alternative to protect the treasury. It may seem counterintuitive to say that
allowing liability against the government would protect the treasury, but the
specter of tort liability would cause governmental institutions to reduce
unnecessary risk taking. This, in turn, would result in fewer damage claims for
negligent conduct. Indeed this approach would have another beneficial
consequence: fewer citizens would be harmed by negligent conduct authorized by
the government.
210
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Opponents of this line of thinking point out that finding the government
liable in tort may result in the government taking on fewer risky endeavors that
benefit society.218 When private firms decide to undertake a risky project, the firm
weighs the legal risk of having to compensate for torts with the financial benefits
to the firm.219 If the expected value220 of the firm’s risky activity outweighs the
cost of compensating victims, a rational firm will undertake the action and receive
the difference in value in the form of profits.
In contrast, a government actor typically has no profit motive. 221 Public
officials are unable to appropriate for themselves the value created by undertaking
risky projects such as MRGO.222 Even if they could, society would likely view the
appropriation of value as corrupt. 223 Thus, for many public officials, taking
excessive risks in pursuit of the public good is all pain and no gain.224
This argument, while technically correct and initially quite persuasive,
simply misses the point. The issue in a case like Katrina Canal Breaches is not
whether a particular official should be held accountable, but rather whether
society should be held accountable for negligent conduct undertaken on their
behalf. The Government vs. Plaintiff dichotomy presents a misleading choice. A
successful suit against the government resulting in a paid judgment is really a suit
against the citizens that the government represents as agent.
This Comment does not argue that individual bureaucrats should be held
personally liable for government torts. The deeper question in Katrina Canal
Breaches is whether society is willing to sacrifice citizens injured by Hurricane
Katrina. This Comment argues that the answer is affirmatively no. If asked, the
Author would answer that most Americans would recognize that major
engineering projects undertaken for the benefit of society in the form of enhanced
military capability are done on behalf of the people. Thus, the principal should, in
certain cases, pay for injuries that result from the negligence of the agent.
In the wake of the district court’s decision in Katrina Canal Breaches, the
possibility of tort liability began to affect the behavior of institutional and
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individual actors. 225 Professionals began to consider that if damages occur
because of environmental degradation to waterways, then liability might attach to
those responsible for operating and maintaining those structures. 226 The
possibility of such liability caused operators of waterways to review maintenance,
inspections, and repairs to ensure they were not done negligently. 227 It is
reasonable to believe that a similar effect would occur in the public sector.
C. Economic Efficiency
From a purely economic point of view, the DFE often produces an
inefficient result. One notorious theory of economic efficiency that has been
applied to tort law is the “Coase Theorem.”228 The basic concept is that when
there are no transaction costs, it makes no difference from an efficiency
standpoint whether the law imposes liability on the injurer (the United States in
FTCA claims) or allows the victim to absorb the damages.229 In either case, the
ultimate result is that the parties will negotiate to an efficient result.230
This efficiency-centric idea is embodied in the concept that liability in tort
should be imposed on the party in the best position to avoid the injury.231 Justice
Jackson’s dissenting opinion in Dalehite echoed this idea when he stated that the
public should not be required “to possess the facilities or the technical knowledge
to learn for itself of . . . dangers.”232 Requiring the public to investigate the cargo
of every ship in the Texas City Harbor and know the dangers involved would
have been highly inefficient.
Similarly, in Katrina Canal Breaches an efficiency analysis cuts in favor of
finding the Army Corps liable. This is because engineering and construction are
highly specialized fields. Imposing damages caused by the breaching of MRGO
on the citizens of New Orleans places an insurmountable burden on them. Such an
imposition would create an implication that each citizen of New Orleans is
required to obtain information on every levee and navigational canal that may
affect him or her during a hurricane. The burden would then be placed on them to
understand or hire an expert to explain the risks involved in continuing to live
within that system.
225
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The more sensible approach is to place the burden of ensuring the public’s
safety on the Army Corps. The Army Corps, having constructed and operated
MRGO for nearly half a century, had greater access to the information and
expertise necessary to avoid the injury. Therefore, the Army Corps’ failure to
properly maintain the levee should result in government liability.
D. Beyond Economics: Justice and Moral Considerations
Focusing on the economic considerations leaves the analysis incomplete.
The goals of tort law are too often boiled down to economic considerations.233
Tort law, like many iterations of legal doctrine, is not static.234 The adjudication
of tort disputes has evolved over centuries.235 The doctrinal practices of tort law
create a framework of adjudication, which then generates critical analysis of the
decisions made by courts. 236 These criticisms are then used to evaluate and
change the doctrine.237 By restricting the analysis to the cold hard economic facts,
courts interfere with this process. As a result, the adjudication of tort cases often
leaves our intuitive need for justice between injurer and the injured unfulfilled.
One noneconomic theory is that of corrective justice. The theory of
corrective justice ignores the economic concept of how resources should be
distributed among society.238 Instead, corrective justice focuses on the equities of
the tortious transaction.239 This concept embodies the intuitive nature of tort law
theory that compels us to recognize an injustice and seek to correct it. The very
pursuit of justice itself is an important goal that helps to maintain our society and
the theoretical underpinnings of the legal system.240
The concept of corrective justice traces its origins back to Aristotle,241 and
has as its premise achieving individual justice between an injurer and an injured
party. 242 Corrective justice can be criticized as impractical because of its
233
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theoretical nature. In our modern society, the idea that justice can be had between
two individuals is challenged by the fact that more often than not insurance
companies pay restitution.243 Since insurance companies ultimately pay for the
injurer (who is only required to pay premiums) justice between the parties is not
achievable in the sense Aristotle had in mind.
This limited view of Aristotle is misguided. Aristotle was less concerned
with the substantive requirements of corrective justice, such as who pays in a
particular dispute.244 Instead, he was interested in how corrective justice fits into
society’s larger conception of virtue.245 A consideration from this point of view is
how a society removes unfair advantages in order to achieve a higher level of
virtue.246 This sense of corrective justice as an element of virtue must start from
the top; the governing state should be the first to reject unfair advantages where
they exist.247
From this perspective, the finding that the Army Corps was negligent
requires the application of liability. To do otherwise would leave the scales of
justice between the parties out of balance. The pursuit of justice itself is worth the
economic disadvantage imposed on the government. Our legal institutions are
dependent upon a delicate presupposition that if citizens are aggrieved, justice can
at least be pursued. The de facto immunity granted to the government in FTCA
claims undermines this fundamental premise in our society.
In addition, the practical criticism that corrective justice would not be
achieved because of insurance is alleviated. Payment for damages as a result of
the negligent operation of MRGO would be paid directly from the coffers of the
federal government.
Of course, the reality is that the government only acts as an agent of the
American people. After all, the government’s money comes from its citizens in
the form of tax payments. It therefore could be argued that the American people
should not be required to pay for the government’s negligence because, in a sense,
they would be paying themselves. Closely related to corrective justice, another
justice-based rationale for finding the government liable rests with the idea that
responsibility in tort can be seen as community judgment for moral fault.248 Under
this theory, the finding that the Army Corps was liable would act as a judgment
by the American people rebuking the negligent conduct of the Army Corps.
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Another concept of fairness and justice lies in the idea of risk and costspreading.249 The central idea is that when many people benefit from an activity
that injures only a few, the costs of the injury should be spread among those who
benefit.250 This theory fits quite nicely with the idea of finding the Army Corps
liable for injuries caused by MRGO. One of the original purposes of MRGO was
to provide more efficient distribution of resources in the event of war. 251 The
Government, acting on behalf of the American people, found that it would be
beneficial to the nation to have a shorter route from New Orleans to the Gulf of
Mexico. The costs associated with the massive destruction caused by the
negligent maintenance of MRGO are appropriately spread among the American
citizens who benefited from greater access to the Port of New Orleans.
CONCLUSION
Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath were events that forever scarred a
nation and called into question whether or not US citizens could trust their
government to protect them. In light of these events and the Army Corps’
negligence in maintaining MRGO, society should begin to question what
Congress intended by the word “discretionary” in the DFE. Black’s Law
Dictionary defines discretionary as: “(Of an act or duty) involving an exercise of
judgment and choice…” 252 Only the most formalistic interpretation of this
definition would allow the Army Corps the discretion to disregard the expansion
of MRGO.
Allowing the Army Corps of Engineers to escape liability for its admittedly
negligent operation of MRGO is unjust. A doctrinal analysis of the facts as found
by Judge Duvall and Judge Smith leads to the conclusion that the DFE should not
apply. More importantly, the citizens of New Orleans deserve a ruling that
recognizes the wrong committed by the Army Corps of Engineers.
There is inherent value in the recognition of a wrong in an official forum
such as a court of law. It provides those injured with the dignity of an official
acknowledgment of their plight. While a monetary recovery would have rebuilt
homes and replaced belongings, the moral recovery that may have resulted from a
finding that the Army Corps was liable, would have helped to heal the broken
spirit of many New Orleanians. On June 24, 2013, the Supreme Court of the
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United States officially denied certiorari to hear the plaintiff’s appeal.253 Thus,
the task of rehabilitating the lost trust of New Orleans in the federal government
will now be in the hands of the United States Congress.
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